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De-Schooling Constitutional Law
For more than two centuries, constitutional law has been created by a
dialogue between generations. As newcomers displace their predecessors, they
begin to challenge parts of the legacy they have inherited while cherishing
other elements of their tradition. The dynamic of challenge-and-preservation
leads to an ongoing effort at synthesis -leaving the next generation with a
legacy that, once again, provokes another cycle of critique and transformation
as parents and grandparents leave the constitutional stage.
This Symposium begins a new round of reappraisal: Now that the civil
rights generation is passing from the scene, how will the twenty-first century
remember its predecessors' achievements? How did the Second Reconstruction
of the twentieth century compare to the First Reconstruction of the nineteenth?
These questions won't be resolved anytime soon. But the energy and
insight of the Synposiasts testify to a continuing devotion to the project of
popular self-government initiated at the Founding. To be sure, all participants
are very privileged members of the academy. If popular sovereignty is to
survive, it will require more than the commitment of an elite corps of legal
scholars. But it is very important for each of us to look beyond our special
insights and contribute to a larger dialogue that reaches beyond the academy to
our fellow Americans.
So what more can I contribute at this stage?
On reading the essays, I see that I have at least one comparative advantage.
This arises from the very long time - more than thirty years! - it has taken me
to carry out my project. As a consequence, I encountered a special difficulty in
writing this book.' On the one hand, lots of people are very interested in the
civil rights revolution, and I wanted to make my presentation reader-friendly.
1. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
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It would have been a real turn-off to announce that people should go back and
study volumes one and two - along with other books'- before plowing into my
analysis of the civil rights era. But on the other hand, there really are many
deep relationships between this book and its predecessors. So I tried to suggest
the linkages only when they were absolutely essential.
I have failed. For perfectly sound reasons, my commentators have focused
on this book, not the entire series. And since they have probed far deeper than
the ordinary reader, I failed to provide sufficient leads to relevant arguments
presented in earlier volumes. This was inevitable: You can't write one book and
three books at the same time. Call it the multivolume problem. Nevertheless, I
can help remedy this deficiency by elaborating the links between The Civil
Rights Revolution and earlier arguments.
My larger aim, though, is to build bridges between interpretive schools that
generally don't have much to say to one another-textualism, on the one hand;
common law constitutionalism, on the other hand; popular constitutionalism,
on the third hand; critical constitutionalism, on the fourth; and there are even
more hands clapping to different beats in other juristic circles. One of the
things the Constitution constitutes is an interpretive community- enabling
Americans with profoundly different beliefs to talk to one another, rather than
past one another, as they hammer out collective solutions to their common
problems. I want to suggest how my framework can help bridge the yawning
chasms that increasingly separate different "schools" of constitutional law.
And finally, I will address some of the big substantive questions provoked
by my interpretation of the civil rights legacy.
But let's start with a search for common ground.
I. COMMON GROUND?
A. Originalism
Like Professor Barnett, I begin with the text's opening words, "We the
People," and struggle to grasp the original understanding of its meaning.' But
we part company at this point. I not only disagree with his interpretations, but
believe that they are self-defeating within their own terms.
2. In particular, BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2005), as well as
BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, Is NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? (1995).
3. Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576 (2014).
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Professor Barnett builds his radically individualistic view of popular
sovereignty on Chisholm v. Georgia.' In his view, the opinions of Justices Jay
and Wilson suggest that rule by the People is a "fiction[]," even when a
constitutional decision has gained the broad support of a mobilized and
decisive majority of Americans.s So long as there is a single dissenter, the myth
of popular sovereignty conceals the fact of majoritarian oppression. Since real-
world people are never unanimous on anything important, Professor Barnett
would focus the constitutional conversation on thinkers, like John Locke, who
try to specify the terms of the social contract that "each and every" one of us
would sign in one or another hypothetical state of nature.
There is only one problem: Professor Barnett's appeal to Chisholm is flatly
inconsistent with his originalist commitment to textualism. However inspiring
he may find the opinions of Jay and Wilson, Americans of the Founding era
emphatically disagreed. It took them only one year to mobilize in Congress and
the states to enact the Eleventh Amendment, which repudiated Chisholm and
propelled the Constitution in a different direction.
There are only two other times in American history when a Supreme Court
judgment has been self-consciously repudiated by formal amendment: the
Fourteenth rejected Dred Scott;' the Sixteenth, the Income Tax Cases."
Interpreting popular sovereignty on the basis of Chisholm is like interpreting
citizenship on the basis of Dred Scott. Professor Barnett must choose: either
he is a textual originalist or he is an advocate of social contract theory. But
not both.
Suppose he abandons originalism, and insists on the teachings of John
Locke, say, to define the fundamental rights guaranteed by "We the People." If
Professor Barnett goes down this path, he cannot base his preference for Locke
on the ground that the Second Treatise influenced some leading Founders.' He
4. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
5. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 2592.
6. Id. at 26oo-o.
7. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
8. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 6oi (1895); Hyde v. Continental Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 654 (1895).
9. Since John Pocock published his great Machiavellian Moment, challenging Locke's centrality
to the American Founding, many intellectual historians have tended to downplay Locke in
favor of republican writers like Harrington. See JOHN G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 424
(1975). But given Professor Barnett's rejection of originalism, there is no need to rehearse




also must be prepared to defend Locke against John Rawls, the greatest
contractualist of the twentieth century."o Rawls famously places each and every
person behind a "veil of ignorance" -arguing that we would all unanimously
choose to maximize the position of the worst-off class." If Rawls is right,
Professor Barnett took the wrong side in the Obamacare case." He should have
tried to persuade the Supreme Court that the Affordable Care Act was
constitutionally required, not prohibited, by America's social contract.
Now I happen to think that Rawls is wrong. Yet Professor Barnett won't
find much help from my arguments in Social Justice in the Liberal State," since
they also support massive redistribution of wealth to the poor. Perhaps he will
find Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia more to his taste, since Nozick
rejects redistributionism. But alas, Nozick rejects contractarianism." If
Professor Barnett wants to reinvigorate a libertarian Lockeanism, he will have
to do it himself, confronting the formidable objections that have deterred many
thoughtful philosophers from this project."
But it's one thing to try to convince the philosophical world that Locke is
right after all. It's quite another to embrace an ideal of constitutional argument
that would authorize the Supreme Court to declare, in the immortal lines of
John Ely: "We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated.""
In any event, I do not understand We the People as a battering ram enabling
me to incorporate the views expressed in Social Justice in the Liberal State into
the Constitution. Once I published my entry into the philosophical
sweepstakes, I refused to spend the rest of my life defending the book against
its critics. 7 I wanted to do something different: Approach the constitutional
tradition with an open mind, in search of its distinctive legitimating principles -
10. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
ii. Id. at 136-42.
12. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Vindication for Challenger ofHealth Care Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/03/27/us/randy-barnetts-pet-cause
-end-of-health-law-hits-supreme-court.html.
13. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
14. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
is. I commend to him books like DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986), but I think
it's fair to say that there is no libertarian contract theorist who has been nearly as influential
as Robert Nozick.
16. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 (1980).
17. But see Bruce A. Ackerman, What is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 ETHICS 372 (1983)
(responding to Benjamin Barber, Brian Barry, Jim Fishkin, Richard Flathman, and Bernard
Williams).
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even if these have turned out to be fundamentally different from those I set out
in my earlier work in political philosophy.
I urge Professor Barnett to take the same path. Our philosophical
disagreements won't disappear anytime soon. Nevertheless, perhaps our
constitutional views converge sufficiently to reach a common understanding of
the Constitution's origins and historical development?
After all, both of us begin our interpretive efforts at the same place-with
the thought of the popular leaders of the Founding era. Only I begin before
John Jay and James Wilson came to the Court and began handing down
opinions. I focus instead on the principles they advanced a few years earlier
when both were leaders in the ratification campaign to gain the assent of We
the People to the Constitution: John Jay, together with Madison and
Hamilton, made a canonical contribution to the original understanding in the
Federalist Papers; James Wilson's speeches at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention were also very influential at the time (even if not as familiar
today). I urge Professor Barnett to accept the verdict of the Eleventh
Amendment and follow me back to these originating sources.
My reading of the Federalist Papers strips away ancestor worship and
recovers the Founders as serious revolutionaries, defying the Articles of
Confederation's demand that all thirteen states consent to all amendments to
its provisions. In justifying the Founders' repudiation of this explicit
requirement, Publius explained
that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to
give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the
former, would render nominal and nugatory, the transcendent and
precious right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."' 9
James Wilson took the same position in a widely publicized speech at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention.2 o
is. See infra note 20.
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 265 (James Madison) (James Ernest Cooke ed., 1961). Note that
Madison is bringing Jefferson's Declaration into the conversation at this key point. For a
host of legal irregularities and Anti-Federalist constitutional objections at a variety of state
ratifying conventions, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 514-48 (1995).
20. Wilson claimed that "the people may change the constitutions whenever and however they




Publius and Wilson did not claim that the Philadelphia Convention had the
revolutionary authority to break with the Articles all by itself. It was only if a
mobilized citizenry followed the Philadelphians' lead by ratifying the
Constitution at state conventions that their centralizing initiative could claim
the authority of We the People. In Madison's words, only the "supreme
authority" exercised by the "people themselves" in state conventions could
"blot out all [the] antecedent errors and irregularities" involved in the
Founders' illegal break with the Articles."
Can a committed originalist really dismiss Publius as a mere myth-maker?
Professor Barnett cites Edmund Morgan as an authority for this position. But
as he recognizes, his appeal to this great historian is problematic." It is rather
the Progressive school, led by Charles Beard, which provides the
historiographic basis for Professor Barnett's cynical view of the Founders.
These Progressives famously condemned the Federalist Papers as mere political
propaganda, covering up the fact that the Founders were engaging in class
warfare against the poor and oppressed. It is odd to see a self-described
"originalist" adopt a similar view. In contrast, I base my interpretation on the
work of Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, John Pocock, and many others, who
have taken seriously the revolutionary aspirations of the Founders.
The key lesson to be learned from the Founding generation is that neither
political elites nor masses-in-the-streets can by themselves earn the authority to
speak in the name of the People. Our Constitution requires revolutionary
leaders and their mobilized followers to work together to demonstrate broad
popular support by winning a series of elections against opponents who had a
fair chance to defeat their initiatives. It is this Founding precedent of mobilized
debate and electoral victory that frames my larger inquiry: Have later
generations, like the Founders, revised the system of higher lawmaking in their
ongoing project to speak for the People in the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries?
Since Professor Barnett undertakes a different, if self-defeating,
interpretation of the Founding, he does not analyze my affirmative answer in
Wilson's remarks, id. at 79, at his greatly admired lectures presented in Philadelphia in 1790
to an audience including many of the leading members of the new Republic.
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 265-66 (James Madison) (James Ernest Cooke ed., 1961).
22. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 2591 n.46.
23. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); POCOCK, supra note 9; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
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detail. For example, he notes that the "phrases 'higher law' or 'higher
lawmaking' appear 24 times" in my new book, but finds that "none of these
phrases is defined" and believes that this conceptual failure disqualifies my
claims about the higher lawmaking status of the civil rights revolution.'
But Chapter 11 of Foundations is titled "Higher Lawmaking," and it
provides the elaborate definitions Professor Barnett demands. The Chapter
develops three fundamental criteria-depth, breadth, and decisiveness-for use
in interrogating all historical efforts to speak in the name of the People.25 My
new book tries to establish that, when judged by these three criteria, the
Second Reconstruction of the 196os represents a far more compelling example
of popular sovereignty than the First Reconstruction of the 186os.
In making out this case, I deploy the same techniques constitutional
lawyers use to elaborate the meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments. Just
as the profession focuses on the congressional speeches of a John Bingham or a
Charles Sumner during the First Reconstruction, I put the spotlight on the
contributions of Hubert Humphrey and Everett Dirksen during the Second;
just as traditional accounts analyze the changing roles of the presidency from
Lincoln through Grant, I trace the evolution of the presidency from Truman
through Nixon; and so forth.
At this point, Professor Barnett encounters another multivolume problem.
In dealing with the First Reconstruction and the New Deal, he says: "Unlike
the Founding, when the revolutionary nature of the change was made clear by
Congress's referring the matter to conventions in the states, this was never the
claim made on behalf of these later changes at the time they were being debated."126
But my second volume, Transformations, pointed to the historical facts that
establish the contrary proposition: During both the first Reconstruction and
the New Deal, the constitutional legitimacy of both Lincoln's and Roosevelt's
revolutions were repeatedly challenged by their opponents, and the legitimacy
of their new higher lawmaking procedures was repeatedly upheld at the ballot
box.7 Once Professor Barnett abandons his ahistorical appeal to John Locke,
his commitment to the original understanding requires him to consider
24. Barnett, supra note 3, at 2579.
25. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 272-78 (1993).
26. Barnett, supra note 3, at 2581 (emphasis added).
27. 2ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 99-252 (2000) (discussing the Reconstruction); id. at 255-382




whether my blow-by-blow description of these latter-day transformations
satisfies the principles of popular sovereignty established at the Founding.
This is not the place to repeat my analysis, but I should restate my basic
conclusion." In the late eighteenth century, the Founders believed that they
could earn the authority to speak for the People by gaining the consent of nine
out of thirteen states under Article Seven. Since this seemed like an appropriate
test for their own initiative, it seemed sensible for the Framers to invite future
constitutional revolutionaries to gain higher lawmaking recognition by
undertaking an analogous higher lawmaking exercise. Just as Washington and
Madison gained the support of a national assembly, Article Five invited would-
be Publians to do the same sort of thing; and then to emulate the Founders by
gaining the support of three-fourths of the states. After all, wasn't it sensible to
suppose that a change in Founding principles should be accomplished through
the same institutional process that led to their prior endorsement by We the
People?'9
It was only after the Civil War that Americans began to create an
alternative higher-lawmaking system for the expression of popular sovereignty.
Out of this terrible conflict emerged a new form of constitutional identity
shared by citizen/soldiers and their families throughout the Union: "We" were
no longer Pennsylvanians first, and Americans, second, as we were in 1787.
"We" were now Americans first, and only derivatively, citizens of the states in
which we chose to reside.
What is more, the institutional precedents created by Thomas Jefferson,
Andrew Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln had by then established that, on
appropriate occasions, the presidency could credibly claim a popular mandate
that the draftsmen of 1787 neither desired nor expected from their First
Magistrate.3 o Given these political and institutional transformations, it was
entirely legitimate for Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats to
rely increasingly on the separation-of-powers in Washington, D.C., to speak in
the name of We the People of the United States.
28. I emphasize this basic point in chapter 1, Are We a Nation?, of the present volume. 3
ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 23-36.
29. This remained an open question. The Founders refused to follow the example of the Articles
of Confederation by expressly stating that the rules of Article Five were exclusive. See 2
ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 34, 71-81.
3o. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 55-77 (on Jefferson); GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW
JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007)
(on Jackson); 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 126-27 (on Lincoln).
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Professor Barnett misses this basic point." On his account, "the only
serious objection to Article V . . . is that its procedures make changing our
Constitution too hard."3 2
This is not my central objection: I agree that higher lawmaking procedures
ought to be hard. The problem is that Article Five's reliance on the assent of
federal and state assemblies is out of sync with more nation-centered
understandings that give the presidency an important role. This is precisely
why we should applaud, not disparage, the constitutional creativity involved in
the transformation of the separation-of-powers into a structure for higher
lawmaking during Reconstruction and the New Deal. As current events in
Washington show, it is no easy thing for a transformative political movement
to maintain control over the presidency, Congress and the Court for the decade
or two required to elaborate and consolidate a fundamental change of our
constitutional principles. But when they manage to do so, they have earned the
precious authority to speak for the People at least as much as when Congress
and state legislatures enact a formal Article Five amendment.
What is more, the leading protagonists of the Second Reconstruction self-
consciously embraced this separation-of-powers model during the civil rights
revolution. Professor Barnett ignores the intensive case study that my book
presents to establish this central claim. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the federal
effort to eliminate the poll tax-one of the White South's great weapons
against black suffrage. 3  During the early sixties, Congress proposed, and the
states ratified, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment banning poll taxes in federal
elections -which went into effect in 1964.
But immediately thereafter, Dr. King's campaign in Selma generated the
movement-energy required to push the President and Congress to ban all poll
taxes as part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Given the recent passage of
Twenty Four, such a sweeping ban raised obvious constitutional questions: If
an Article Five amendment was required to authorize a narrow prohibition
31. It appears explicitly in the current volume in both the first chapter and the concluding one,
see 3 AcKERMAN, supra note s, at 28-30, 311, although previous volumes elaborate the point at
length.
32. Barnett, supra note 3, at 2586.
33. Chapters 5 and 6 build on a collaboration with Jennifer Nou that led to the joint publication
of Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the
Poll Tax, 103 Nw. U. L. REV 63 (2009). While I have revised the article's basic argument in





restricted to federal elections, wasn't another Article Five amendment required
to impose a sweeping ban in all state and local elections?
After fierce and extended public debate, Congress' answer was No. The
landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965 self-consciously created a new statutory
system of higher lawmaking-in which all three branches cooperated in the
radical revision of deeply entrenched principles of federalism. My forty-eight-
page case study follows the statutory elaboration of this "coordinate model" of
inter-branch cooperation step-by-step- showing the decisive contributions
made by the bipartisan congressional leadership, Attorney General Katzenbach,
President Johnson, and Martin Luther King, Jr. to the new system.14 All this
goes unnoticed in Professor Barnett's formalist account.
To sum up: Once Professor Barnett abandons his self-defeating reliance on
Chisholm, I very much hope that he seriously considers the enduring
significance of the Federalist Papers' rival theory, emphasizing the revolutionary
right of the People to refashion the law of higher lawmaking; and that he
confronts the historical record that demonstrates how latter-day movements-
up to and including the Second Reconstruction- followed the Founders'
precedent by reworking the law of higher-lawmaking in ways that expressed
Americans' changing understanding of their constitutional identity. If he does
so, I am sure that his responses will greatly enrich the ongoing legal
conversation -and build new bridges to approaches that may seem starkly
opposed to his own.
B. Critical Constitutionalism
On first impression, there is a yawning gap between Professor Barnett and
Professor Levinson, who is justly famous for his view that the Constitution
requires a total overhaul." While I debate the original understanding of Article
Five with Professor Barnett, Professor Levinson offers a very different critique:
He thinks that I'm too mired in the Founding tradition, and its subsequent
transformations, to consider the large contributions made by twentieth-century
Progressives to the theory and practice of popular sovereignty. He
34. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 83-123, 354-62.
35. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA's 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
36. Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution: Tensions in the
Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644 (2014).
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emphasizes the way state constitutions have massively adopted Progressive
systems of initiative, referenda, and recall over the past century, and urges me
to take them seriously in reforming higher lawmaking practices on the national
level.
I agree. Indeed, this Progressive tradition has already influenced my
analysis of modern higher-lawmaking. As I argued in Transformations, the
separation-of-powers system emerging out of the New Deal and the Second
Reconstruction suffered a serious blow in the aftermath of the Bork
nomination in 1987. Acting in the spirit of Franklin Roosevelt, President
Reagan had set about repealing the New Deal constitution through New Deal
methods: Rather than relying on formal Article Five amendments, he sought to
revolutionize entrenched constitutional understandings by making a series of
transformative appointments to the Supreme Court. Just as Roosevelt
nominated Felix Frankfurter to spearhead the New Deal Court's elaboration of
the principles of the activist regulatory state, Reagan nominated Robert Bork
to provide the intellectual heft to transform the existing regime into a neo-
liberal constitutional order."'
Reagan's effort failed, but Bork's rejection by the Senate had enduring
consequences, seriously damaging the modern higher-law system based on the
separation of powers. Bork famously treated his Senate confirmation hearing as
a great "national seminar" to instruct the American people on the bright future
promised by his revolutionary jurisprudence. But after his rejection, nominees
never made this mistake again. Henceforth, both Democratic and Republican
Presidents pursued their constitutional ambitions by advancing "stealth"
nominees-who might (or might not) reveal their revolutionary intentions
once they safely made it to the bench.
This is an abuse of the principle of popular sovereignty. Before would-be
revolutionaries can gain a mandate for fundamental change, the President and
his party should be obliged to make their constitutional case in public. They
also should be required to win a series of electoral victories in support of
decisive change -not achieve their objectives by the devious use of Supreme
Court appointments. To remedy post-Bork pathologies, Transjormations
proposed a new landmark statute that would provide an alternative to "stealth"
revolutions."9 Under its provisions, a second-term President could place
constitutional initiatives before the voters if they were approved by appropriate
37. 2ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 403-16.
38. Id. at 383-420; Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, ioi HARv. L. REV. 1164 (1988).




majorities of the House and Senate. If a supermajority of voters then supported
the initiative at the next two presidential elections, courts should treat them as
fully authorized by the People of the United States, and give them higher-law
status equivalent to Article Five amendments passed by We the People of the
United States.
Whatever its deficiencies, my proposal has all the virtues of formalism that
Professor Barnett emphasizes in his defense of a rule-based approach to
constitutional amendment. Once he recognizes the anti-textualist character of
his reliance on Chisholm, I hope that he will seriously consider supporting my
formalist solution to the serious problems that stealth appointments pose in
our real-world system of higher-lawmaking.
Professor Levinson, however, thinks that my reform proposal is too timid.
He emphasizes that it would allow only the President and Congress to decide
whether the voters should be consulted in a popular referendum. This pro-
establishment bias will block the sweeping reforms he believes are necessary
before the Constitution can deal with the twenty-first century. Given this
diagnosis, Professor Levinson proposes a far more sweeping adoption of
Progressive techniques that will allow ordinary citizens to trigger national
plebiscites.
I am not convinced. When we test Progressive dreams against California
realities, it seems pretty clear that moneyed interests have corrupted voter
initiatives, making a mockery of the ideal of citizen-sovereignty. Given this
fact, I continue to think it's wise to authorize only second-term presidents to
put referenda before the electorate, and only if Congress backs them up, and
voters approve in two successive elections. 4 o
A more emphatic embrace of Progressive ideas might be justified if we were
to succeed in both restricting the role of big money and providing serious
occasions for citizens to deliberate on big electoral issues before casting their
ballots."1 But unless and until we make real progress in these areas, I cannot
join Levinson's campaign for more sweeping Progressive reforms.
40. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation ofPowers, 113 HARv. L. REv. 633, 666-68 (2000).
41. For a proposal in campaign finance, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH
DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002). Larry Lessig has been doing
great work propelling a similar reform into the center of public debate. See LAWRENCE
LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT
(2011). I have also been working with my friend Jim Fishkin to work out a proposal to create
a new institutional forum to support serious citizen deliberation before important elections.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004). For a brief overview
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C. Popular Constitutionalism
But let's stop speculating about tomorrow. The main task of my new book
is to understand how the higher lawmaking system actually operated the day-
before-yesterday -when the civil rights movement engaged with the national
political leadership during the Second Reconstruction.
This issue is taken up by Professors Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Lani Guinier
and Gerald Torres, and Rogers Smith.4 ' They all support my challenge to the
profession's narrow fixation on the constitutional legacy of the Warren and
Burger Courts. But they criticize the Washington-centered character of my
separation-of-powers story, believing that it fails to do justice to the central
role played by millions of ordinary Americans in the civil rights movement. To
be sure, I give great prominence to Dr. King's Letter from a Birmingham Jail,
and gesture toward the large significance of civil rights mobilizations in the rest
of the country. But even in Dr. King's case, I tend to emphasize his Beltway
bargains with President Johnson and Congress in hammering out the great
landmark statutes.
I agree with this critique. From the time of the Founding, higher
lawmaking in America has neither been an elite construction nor the simple
reflex of grass-roots mobilization. It has been the product of an ongoing
dialogue between transformative leaders and ordinary Americans, culminating
in a series of self-conscious popular decisions by the voters in support of the
new regime.
The only excuse for the book's top-down treatment is my own personal
race with time: It's taken me thirteen years to write The Civil Rights Revolution,
and this seems a good moment to pass the torch on to the next generation.4 1 I
hope that, with scholars like Brown-Nagin, Guinier, Torres, and Smith in the
lead, the profession will be moving on to a deeper understanding of the Second
Reconstruction than the one I've managed to present.
of the entire reform package, see Bruce Ackerman, Reviving Democratic Citizenship?, 41 POL.
& Soc'Y 309 (2013).
42. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below, 123 YALE L.J. 2698 (2014);
Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence ofLaw and
Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014); Rogers M. Smith, Ackerman's Civil Rights
Revolution and Modern American Racial Politics, 123 YALE L.J. 2906 (2014).
43. Indeed, my Conclusion calls for further exploration of the complex ways in which "bottom-
up accounts of the civil rights movement shaped and reshaped the terms of the




But I do have some problems with my commentators' more particular
claims. 4 It is one thing to emphasize, in Professor Brown-Nagin's words, the
"agenda-setting" power of the larger civil rights movement; quite another, to
disparage "the 'malignant kinship' that [Martin Luther King, Jr.] forged with
Lyndon Johnson." 4  (Professors Guinier and Torres express similar
sentiments. )
I disagree with this condemnation of Dr. King. To win the support of We
the People of the United States, it was not enough to rally millions of activists to
the civil rights movement; it was also necessary to gain the support of tens of
millions of Americans who were less engaged, but nevertheless entitled to a
voice and a vote on the nation's constitutional destiny." There was nothing
"malignant" in King's decision to engage in the inevitable compromises
required to gain broad support for transformative legislation. To the contrary,
he was demonstrating constitutional statesmanship of the highest order-
enabling President Johnson and Congress, for example, to place the Civil
Rights Act before the voters in 1964, thereby putting them on notice that the
bipartisan coalition of liberal Democrats and Republicans was now seriously
engaged in rewriting the terms of America's social contract.
Similarly, Professors Guinier and Torres are right to emphasize the
importance of grassroots leaders like Fannie Lou Hamer, whose compelling
presence at the Democratic Convention of 1964 helped pave the way for the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. But so far as the critical election of 1964 was
concerned, Barry Goldwater's conduct was far more consequential. In taking
the Senate floor to denounce the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Goldwater not only
dissented on policy grounds; he engaged in a frontal assault on the statute's
constitutional legitimacy. By nominating Goldwater over the liberal Nelson
Rockefeller, the Republican Convention was offering the American People a
"choice, not an echo" on the constitutional principles advanced by President
Johnson and Congress in their landmark civil rights initiative.
Professor Driver challenges my characterization of Goldwater's role,
suggesting that the Republican candidate's approach "was considerably more
44. I will defer further consideration of Professor Smith's arguments to Part II of this essay.
45. Brown-Nagin, supra note 42, at 2715.
46. See Guinier & Torres, supra note 42, at 2767-76.
47. In terms of the definitions of popular sovereignty developed in Chapter 11 of Volume 1, the
civil rights movement was essential in establishing "depth," but more was required to
establish the "breadth" and "decisiveness" of the supermajority required for an authoritative
act by We the People. 1 ACKERmAN, supra note 25, at 295-322.
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indirect than [my] 'frontal assault' metaphor connotes."48 He points out that
Goldwater never deployed racist rhetoric, and had supported some anti-
discrimination laws. Isn't it overstating things to portray him as an implacable
foe of the Civil Rights Act?
I stand by my characterization. It was precisely the non-racist character of
Goldwater's assault on the Act that made it so seductive. By choosing
Goldwater over Johnson, ordinary voters did not have to endorse racism to
bring the Second Reconstruction to a screeching halt.
Goldwater gave them a different option: He attacked the Civil Rights Act's
foundation in the New Deal commerce clause, urging Americans to return to
the Old Court jurisprudence that, in the words of the New York Times, had
been repudiated by "the courts in the late nineteen-thirties."4 9  hat is more,
Lyndon Johnson refused to respond to Goldwater's critique with obfuscations
and ambiguities. He counterattacked with a spirited defense of both New Deal
constitutionalism and the transformative principles expressed by the Civil
Rights Act.so As a consequence, his crushing defeat of Goldwater served as a
key moment in the process by which the American people redefined their
constitutional identity.
Professor Driver is unimpressed. Appealing to Albert Hirschman's analysis
of reactionary rhetoric, he fails to appreciate Goldwater's key role in providing
Americans with a "choice, not an echo." This isn't a critique of Hirschman,
who wasn't a constitutional lawyer; nor is it really a critique of Driver, who
rightly sees Hirschman's relevance in analyzing the current predicaments of
some liberal constitutionalists. But it is better to turn from Hirschman to
Publius, and later spokesmen for higher lawmaking, when assessing
Goldwater's importance to America's constitutional development. By providing
a "choice, not an echo," his candidacy transformed the election into a vehicle
that ultimately provided Johnson with the national mandate from the People
required to legitimate further civil rights initiatives.
It is the national character of the 1964 mandate which leads me to a final
caveat. Professors Brown-Nagin, Guinier, and Torres go beyond the struggles
surrounding the landmark statutes to consider mobilizations for social justice
after the civil rights revolution had run its course. But they don't sufficiently
48. Justin Driver, Reactionary Rhetoric and Liberal Legal Academia, 123 YALE L.J. 2616, 262o n.11
(2014).
49. Id. at 2625 n.39 (quoting Anthony Lewis, The Courts Spurn Goldwater View, N.Y. THWES,
June 19, 1964, at 18).




appreciate that these later campaigns never gained the repeated and self-
conscious consent of the American people on the national level -and so fail to
qualify as authoritative acts of We the People.
Professor Brown-Nagin, for example, turns her attention to the War on
Poverty, and says that Lyndon Johnson considered it to be an integral part of
his program of revolutionary reform. I agree. If you will forgive my jargon,
Johnson's poverty initiatives served as a constitutional signal in much the same
way that Brown had catapulted the question of racial justice onto center stage in
1954. But as David Super shows," the anti-poverty campaign did not repeat the
success of the civil rights movement in winning the mobilized consent of the
American people over the next decade. To the contrary, when George
McGovern appealed to voters for an anti-poverty mandate in the 1972 elections,
Americans crushed his hopes as thoroughly as they crushed Goldwater's attack
on the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, even where civil rights were concerned, the era
of mobilized popular commitment to further sweeping change had ended by
the time Gerald Ford succeeded Richard Nixon in 1973.52
Constitutional moments do not last forever-this is what Madison taught
in the Federalist Papers, and Madison's analysis has been vindicated time and
again in our national life." When my commentators provide thick descriptions
of successful local implementation of the Equal Opportunity Act or the
mobilization of the United Farm Workers, these engaging case studies should
not divert us from the hard truth: since 1973, We the People of the United States
have never again mobilized repeatedly at the polls in support of a decisive
breakthrough for economic or racial equality.
This doesn't mean that the last fifty years of normal politics are devoid of
significance. While economic and racial egalitarians have had to compete with
many other issues and movements for political and legal support, they have
scored many victories - as well as stinging defeats. And latter day popular
mobilizations - both on the left and the right - have played an important role
in shaping the current policy terrain.
In his important essay, Professor David Super invites us to consider
whether any of these movements have generated "petit constitutional" micro-
moments deserving of special recognition.54 In raising this possibility,
si. David A. Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, 123 YALE L.J. 28o6 (2014).
52. See 3 AcKERMAN, supra note 1, at 276-87.
53. See i ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 169-99.
54. See Super, supra note 51.
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Professor Super contributes to an important debate precipitated by Professors
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, who also argue for the quasi-
constitutional status of a special class of "superstatutes" (although on very
different grounds than those offered by Super).ss
I hope to contribute to this debate in the future, but this was not my aim in
the present book. The Civil Rights Revolution tries to put recent decades of
normal politics into perspective by establishing that there was indeed a
moment, a half-century ago, when Congress, the President, and the Court
spoke with the full authority of We the People in support of a Second
Reconstruction -and it calls on the rising generation of lawyers and judges to
preserve this great constitutional legacy as they confront the challenges of the
twenty-first century.
D. Common Law Constitutionalism
Which brings me to the question raised by Professors Justin Driver and
David Strauss in different ways: What was the appropriate role of the Warren
and Burger Courts during the constitutional revolution, and what should be the
Court's future role in preserving the civil rights legacy?
Professor Driver is right in believing that I refuse to join in the general
retreat from judicial review that characterizes the contemporary work of many
liberal constitutionalists. 6 Professor Strauss is right to suggest that my
understanding of the judicial role differs from the common law approach he
develops in his well-known work."
In engaging with my book, Professor Strauss's essay should serve as a
model for the collaborative conversations of the future. After all, he is famous
for his straight-out denial that the formal text plays a significant role in real-
world adjudication, and it would have been easy for him to dismiss my effort to
revitalize higher lawmaking by emphasizing the role of landmark statutes.
Instead, he incorporates large elements of my analysis into his understanding
of the civil rights revolution, and then proceeds to redefine key issues for the
next round of discussion.
55. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010).
56. See Driver, supra note 48, at 2638 n.sol.
57. See David A. Strauss, The Neo-Hamiltonian Temptation, 123 YALE L.J. 2676, 2689 (2014); see




He is right to emphasize that we continue to have significant
disagreements.s' On my view, the fundamental task of the Supreme Court is to
preserve the past achievements of popular sovereignty once American politics
returns to its normal modes of operation. As national attention turns to other
issues, politicians will have a hard time sustaining higher lawmaking
commitments if this will make it tougher for them to win the next election. In
contrast, life tenure and professional training predispose the men and women
on the Supreme Court to take more seriously the great moments in American
history when We the People spoke in a higher lawmaking voice.
I sketched out the character of the Court's preservationist mission in
Foundations," and so the briefest summary will suffice. The place to begin is
with a distinctive feature of America's constitutional practice. While the Great
Seal of the United States announced the arrival of a Novus Ordo Seclorum -a
New Order for the Ages - the Founders were not trying to transform
everything at once in their zeal to create a Brave New World. They were aiming
instead for deep-cutting, but partial, revolutionary reforms -and so were their
successors during the First Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Second
Reconstruction.
The partial character of American revolutions generates a distinctive
interpretive problem-call it intergenerational synthesis. Since our
Constitution is the work of many generations, it is up to the courts to
synthesize these partial transformations into a coherent doctrinal whole. From
the days of John Marshall and Roger Taney, constitutional litigation has
become an engine for this project-with one side arguing that the meaning of
Constitutional Moment A should govern their case while opponents rely on
Constitutional Moment B as their principal source of law. This point-
counterpoint has required the courts to undertake an ongoing effort to
synthesize the meaning of our multiple constitutional moments into a coherent
doctrinal pattern.
A contemporary example is the familiar debate over the extent to which the
Fourteenth Amendment, enacted at Time Two, "incorporates" the Bill of
Rights, enacted at Time One. Scholars and judges have been arguing about the
right way to synthesize these two different pronouncements for a very long
time - and they will continue to do so. A great deal of professional judgment is
required to resolve these intergenerational issues in a case-by-case fashion-
58. Strauss, supra note 57, at 2689.
59. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 81-162.
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sometimes requiring the exercise of techniques like those which Professor
Strauss commends.
But these similarities should not be allowed to conceal a basic difference.
The preservationist Court always tries to anchor its judgments in the original
understandings of the relevant constitutional moments-thereby preserving
the basic principles of each moment while doing justice to the case at hand. It
sometimes happens, of course, that a later decision of the People directly
conflicts with an earlier one-in which case, the later decision should be
followed. But there are many cases in which principles from both eras can be
harmonized into a larger pattern which takes both generations' commitments
seriously. Indeed, there are many situations in which a proper synthesis
requires the integration of principles inherited from several eras of
constitutional politics -challenging the courts to do justice to principles
inherited from the Founding, Reconstruction, New Deal, and the Second
Reconstruction in a thoughtful fashion.
This is no easy task-which is precisely why the ongoing collaboration of
judges, lawyers, and scholars is so necessary if the legal profession is to fulfill
its responsibilities to the American people. To make the problem even more
complex, the profession must make an ongoing effort to apply its principled
synthesis to cases arising in a country whose economic and social life
increasingly diverges from the America in which the People first announced
one or another of its constitutional commitments. While changing
circumstances require courts to adapt principles in a contextually compelling
fashion, they should never operate as an excuse for courts to erase these
60commitments.
This is the danger raised by an overenthusiastic embrace of Professor
Strauss's common law methods. I don't want to overemphasize the risk. As he
makes plain, his common-law judge is attentive to history- major precedents
typically express large principles inherited from earlier eras of constitutional
politics. Moreover, as Strauss's model judge adapts the case-law tradition to
express the spirit of her own era, she will look to major legislative and
presidential initiatives -including landmark statutes-in determining which
precedents are ripe for overruling. But as Professor Strauss emphasizes,
landmark statutes are only one of many resources for sound judicial
development. He also invites his common law judge to consider evolving social




and economic mores as well as his or her own understanding of good public
policy.
6 ,
Given Professor Strauss's capacious sense of acceptable methods, there is a
very real risk that his brand of constitutionalism will permit the courts to lose
sight of fundamental commitments reached by the People in earlier
generations. I will provide a contemporary example of this danger later, 6 but it
is enough to emphasize the basic constraint that emerges from my
preservationist approach: The Supreme Court has no authority to repudiate
the commitments of the People of prior eras merely because they don't
conform to its reading of evolving social mores, let alone its views of good
public policy. If the constitutional legacy of prior generations seems
unsatisfactory, it's up to the People of the twenty-first century to repudiate
these earlier commitments by engaging in the same kind of mobilized politics
that was required to enact them in the first place. Until this happens, the job of
the Supreme Court is to respect the past achievements of We the People.
There is a lot more to be said about the relationship between common-law
and preservationist methods. But for now, it's more important to respond to a
more particular challenge raised by Professor Strauss: "[O]n Ackerman's
account," he asks, "why was Brown a lawful decision [at all] ?",6, What gave the
Warren Court the authority to begin a constitutional revolution at a time when
President Eisenhower and Congress showed no inclination to take on the race
question, and Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks had not even begun their
campaign in Montgomery?
This is a crucial question: If I can't answer it, it would put me on the side of
the congressional authors of the Southern Manifesto of 1956, who denounced
Brown as unconstitutional. If Professor Strauss is right, I would be placed in a
self-defeating situation analogous to the one confronting Professor Barnett-in
which I can only defend my views by repudiating some of my key premises.
I plead not guilty. As I argue in Foundations 6 Brown v. Board should be
viewed as an exercise in intergenerational synthesis. To see my point, we must
go beyond familiar One-Two problems like the "incorporation debate," and
consider how intergenerational issues multiply once judges confront the
constitutional contributions of the New Deal (Time Three) and the Civil
61. See STRAUSS, supra note 57, at 92.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 128-132.
63. Strauss, supra note 57, at 2694.
64. See 1 ACKERmIAN, supra note 25, at 142-53.
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Rights Revolution (Time Four). Within this expanding framework,
Foundations presents Brown as an early judicial effort at Two-Three synthesis. I
will summarize my earlier argument with a new analogy, asking you to
consider Brown's family resemblance to Shelley v. Kraemer, decided a few years
earlier."
Shelley confronted pre-New Deal decisions that allowed homeowners to use
their freedom of contract to exclude blacks from their community. But now
that the New Deal had repudiated freedom of contract as a central
constitutional principle at Time Three, Shelley insisted on the need to rethink
the meaning of equal protection enacted at Time Two. Given the People's new
and fundamental commitment to the activist regulatory state emerging from
the 1930s, the Roosevelt Court of the 1940s rightly rejected the notion that
there is no "state action" involved in the judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants. Within the emerging framework of New Deal
constitutionalism, the enforcement of these contracts was a discretionary
matter of public policy, not the expression of a pre-political right of contract.
As a consequence, Shelley engaged in a model act of Two-Three synthesis in
finding that the Equal Protection Clause required a rejection of pre-existing
doctrine that presupposed a natural-rights foundation for freedom of contract.
While Shelley focused on the broader implications of the New Deal's
repudiation of laissez-faire constitutionalism, Brown focused on a key issue
arising out of the New Deal's affirmation of the welfare state. Given the New
Deal turn, public education now appeared as a paradigmatic success story of
activist government, requiring a reassessment of Plessy's key claim that the
"underlying fallacy" in the integrationist argument was that state-ordered
segregation "stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority . . . solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it., 66
This was no longer a "fallacy" in a constitutional order that affirmed state
responsibility for so many outcomes in previously private sectors. For the
Warren Court, it was obvious that black children did not, as Plessy asserted,
"choose" to interpret segregated schooling as a badge of inferiority. Instead,
Brown found that "separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group," and that this ongoing process of
institutionalized humiliation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
65. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).




in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone."67
In my next book on Interpretations, I hope to refine the relationship
between the project of intergenerational synthesis and (different)
understandings of common-law constitutionalism. But I hope I've said enough
to suggest why I don't accept Professor Strauss's suggestion that my approach
to Brown is "lawless."68 I view Brown instead as a paradigmatic example of
Two-Three synthesis, rethinking the meaning of "equal protection" in a world
in which the activist state has accepted responsibility for achieving real-world
results in broad-ranging spheres of social and economic life.
11. THE MEANING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
A. Beyond Brown
But enough jurisprudential chit-chat.
For Professor Kennedy, Brown was a political decision through and
through. He emphasizes Warren's desire to write an opinion that was "short,
readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional, and above all, non-
accusatory."6' But Warren's determination to avoid inflammatory rhetoric is
perfectly consistent with a good-faith effort at legal analysis. After all, judicial
opinions generally strive to be "unemotional." Sometimes it is possible to walk
and chew gum at the same time: Why wasn't Warren successful in managing
this tricky business?
Indeed, the Chief Justice's effort to reach out to the general public helps
explain why Brown was so successful in shaping the escalating debate over the
next decade. Once again, Professor Kennedy is skeptical, challenging me to
provide "empirical evidence" of Brown's impact. I must confess that my
judgment is based on nothing more than years of immersion in the primary
sources: Brown's "short [and] readable""o opinion was reprinted by newspapers
throughout the country, and it was the subject of endless popular commentary
67. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (emphasis added).
68. Professor Strauss also suggests that my approach will experience great difficulty in dealing
with the constitutional transformation of the status of women since the 1970s. For my
treatment of these issues, see Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the Women's Movement, 94 CAL.
L. REv. 1421 (20o6).
69. Randall L. Kennedy, Ackerman's Brown, 123 YALE L.J. 3064,3o66 (2014).
70. Id.
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in the weeks and years that followed. Perhaps it's time for some big-data
analysts to enter this particular dispute. The number-crunchers have come to
my rescue on similar questions raised by my work in the past."
In any event, Professor Kennedy's main complaint isn't with Brown's
impact on the media, but with Warren's message: he condemns the opinion
because it "says remarkably little about segregation's origins, ideology,
implementation, or aims."" Or again, "Warren's opinion portrays an insult
without an insulter."7 3
I agree. I only disagree with Professor Kennedy's suggestion that it might
have been more politically productive to speak in a more prophetic voice. 4 Our
debate on this issue should not, however, prevent us from coming to an
understanding ofBrown's enduring significance.
Mter all, both of us agree that the conventional understanding of Brown's
legacy is misconceived. On the standard view that we both reject, Warren's
opinion is a turning point in an ongoing judicial conversation that continues
through Loving and Bakke up to the latest Delphic utterances by the Roberts
Court on affirmative action. In contrast, both of us insist on a regime-oriented
approach, which puts Brown in conversation with the men and women who
successfully struggled to gain the assent of We the People to the landmark
statutes of the 196os- showing how Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King, Hubert
Humphrey, Lyndon Johnson, and many others took up themes that Warren
had introduced to the "lay public" in his "nonrhetorical, unemotional" fashion.
In the final analysis, it is of no great importance whether Parks or Humphrey
were directly influenced by Warren, or whether all of them were independent
71. 1 have attempted an amateurish survey on Google Books Ngram to determine the frequency
of "Brown v. Board" in its collection of American books. Unsurprisingly, this phrase appears
twice as often in 1954 as it did in 1953; but it doubles again by 1960, and again by 1970,
suggesting an enduring impact. Obviously, a serious study should explore other verbal
formulations, and investigate their frequency in newspapers and magazines, not only books.
See GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content
=Brown+v.+Board&year start=195o&year end=197o&corpus=-7 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
For similar big-data investigations of other claims in We the People, see Daniel E. Ho &
Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALysis 69 (2010); and
Daniel Taylor Young, Note, How Do You Measure a Constitutional Moment? Using Algorithmic
Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J.
1990 (2013).
72. Kennedy, supra note 69, at 3067.
73. Id.




vehicles of the constitutional Zeitgeist. Or, if you will allow me to lapse into my
native legalese: We can both join forces in elaborating the original public
meaning of the landmark statutes and judicial super-precedents of the Second
Reconstruction- and thereby allow the coming generation to preserve more
intelligently this precious part of their constitutional legacy.
I invite Professor Kennedy to join in this exercise with the formidable
lawyerly tools at his command.
B. Landmark Principles
Let me proceed, then, to a summary statement of the principles reached by
the Congress, the President, and the Court during the Second Reconstruction.
First, the landmark statutes do not endorse an anti-discrimination principle
or an anti-subordination principle or any other one-size-fits-all approach to
equal protection. Second, these landmarks impose different egalitarian
principles in different spheres of life- employment, housing, public
accommodations, schooling, and voting, to name the most important. Third,
as a general rule, these sphere-specific principles do not take account of the
treatment that groups receive in other spheres. Fourth, Brown's anti-
humiliation principle serves as a constitutional floor in all spheres, but it does
not serve as a ceiling. Institutions have a constitutional responsibility to achieve
more ambitious egalitarian objectives - real-world equal opportunity in
employment and housing markets, a fair share of political power for minorities
in democratic politics, and so on. Fifth, it is constitutionally appropriate for
government to monitor institutional compliance with spherical principles by
using technocratic statistical techniques. Last but not least, both private and
public institutions are under the same obligations to fulfill their spherical
responsibilities.s So long as the sphere is a strategic site of constitutional
concern, these egalitarian obligations do not depend on whether government is
visibly involved in the ways suggested by the traditional state doctrine.
Professor Rogers Smith heartily endorses the pragmatism of this overall
scheme, but he has doubts about some of its moving parts. His first target is
the notion of distinctive sociological spheres of life. In his view, the sphere-by-
sphere approach is neither "logically mandated [n]or even logically
consistent." "
75. See generally 3 AcKERMAN, supra note i, at 127-310.
76. Smith, supra note 42, at 2915.
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I agree that logic alone doesn't compel sphericity. Even during the Second
Reconstruction, Congress and the courts created exceptions to an exclusively
spherical focus, and as Cary Franklin notes,7 7 they have more recently
expanded interspherical concerns in dealing with work-home relationships in
achieving equal employment opportunity for women. What is more, my
closing pages call for a Third Reconstruction in which the constitutional order
would move beyond spherical limits to guarantee equal protection to broad
classes of people mired in poverty or confronting systematic stigmatization. My
only point is that, despite the urgings of Lyndon Johnson and Martin Luther
King, the American people did not embrace such system-wide principles of
social justice during the Second Reconstruction.
I part company with Professor Smith, however, when he claims that the
spherical approach is "logically" inconsistent. Consider, for example, the Price
Waterhouse case described by Professor Richard Ford, in which the accounting
firm turned down a Ms. Hopkins for a partnership "because of shortcomings in
her 'interpersonal skills." 8 Ms. Hopkins was allegedly deficient because she
failed to follow advice that "to improve her chances for promotion she should
'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry.' 7
Professor Ford argues that, if such allegations were true, Price Waterhouse
breached its organizational obligation to provide Ms. Hopkins the real-world
equal opportunity demanded by Title VII. My interpretation of the original
understanding of the landmark statute strongly supports his position.so
He returns the favor, moreover, by providing me with ammunition in my
argument with Professor Smith on sphericity. To see the point, suppose that
Ms. Hopkins turned out to be the child of a wealthy family, who went to an
exclusive private school and college before graduating from an elite business
school, and that she quicldy transcends her defeat at Price Waterhouse by
getting a first-rate job elsewhere. Although she may remain firmly in the top
tenth of one percent, Price Waterhouse has nevertheless breached its spherical
obligations to her. My hypothetical Hopkins may have suffered no wrong
under the anti-subordination principle, but she can still appeal to the spherical
77. Cary Franklin, Separate Spheres, 123 YALE L.J. 2878, 2889 (2014).
78. Richard Thompson Ford, Rethinking Rights After the Second Reconstruction, 123 YALE L.J.
2942,2952 (2014) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234 (1989)).
79. Id. at 2953 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235).




principle that insists on real-world equal opportunity in the workplace. This
shows that there is nothing logically "incoherent" about spherical justice.
But Professor Smith is right to suggest that anti-subordination provided a
very serious competitor during the 196os as Congress and the courts tried to
hammer out a new constitutional approach to equal protection in the Jim Crow
South. He emphasizes that Southern blacks experienced "systemic
humiliation" in "economic, political, legal, residential, religious, cultural,
recreational, [and] romantic" areas of life in a totalizing fashion." Within this
context, Congress and the courts were indeed faced with a big doctrinal choice.
On the one hand, they could have invoked the anti-subordination principle to
emphasize the systematic humiliations imposed by Jim Crow; on the other
hand, they could have tried to remedy racial injustice one sphere at a time.
The protagonists were perfectly aware that they were at a crossroads -with
judges like John Minor Wisdom82 and senators like Abraham Ribicoff"
forcefully making the case for the systemic approach over its spherical rival. I
myself would have vastly preferred it if they had won this great debate. But
alas, the statutory history and the evolving case-law reveals a clear choice in
favor of spherical justice.
Professor Cary Franklin reads this history differently, arguing that the
Second Reconstruction admits of multiple interpretations.4 On her view, the
canonical materials suggest a greater emphasis on interspherical impacts. To
assess her claim, distinguish between two ways in which interspherical impact
enters the basic equal protection argument developed by Warren in Brown and
elaborated during the next two decades. Here is how I described the first
question: "[N]ow that courts [and other decisionmakers] recognize the
plurality of social spheres, they must begin to assign priorities. Which spheres
are central for the guarantee of equal protection, and which aren't?""'
To resolve this priority issue, it's only common sense to consider
interspherical relationships. Warren explains, for example, that he is
prioritizing public schools in Brown because of their importance in preparing
students for democratic citizenship, for military service, for professional
81. Smith, supra note 42, at 2915.
82. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 236-37.
83. Id. at 261.
84. Franklin, supra note 77.
85. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 130. In my five-stage reconstruction of Brown's lost logic, the
priority question represents step 3 in the larger argument.
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training, and the like.86 In developing her counter-interpretation of the
sources, most of Professor Franklin's examples involve inter-spherical appeals
of this type-justifying intensive statutory or judicial concern with the
distinctive problems raised by employment, higher education, housing,
marriage, or voting.8' While much of her discussion is persuasive, it is
irrelevant to the key issue raised by my thesis-which only arises at the next
stage of the analysis: Once a sphere is given priority, how to evaluate the
participants' claims to equal protection? In particular, if they have been treated
unconstitutionally in other spheres, should this fact be taken into account?8 8
This is the question I mean to emphasize in speaking of interspherical
impact, and it is here where I find Professor Franklin's expansive interpretation
less compelling. On her view, I single out one Supreme Court decision as the
"only instance in which the landmark decisions and statutes of the Second
Reconstruction departed from 'a sphere-by-sphere approach to racial
injustice."'' This is Gaston County v. United States,"o which struck down
literacy tests imposed on would-be black voters when they had received
inferior segregated educations which made it harder to pass such tests. Despite
some misleading language, I did not intend to claim that Gaston County was
unique, but that it served "as a counterexample to my general thesis" rejecting
inter-spherical impact, and that "there aren't lots of others."' In any event,92 I
agree with her conclusion that "by 1970, it seems fair to say that concerns about
interspherical impacts-at least those generated by racial inequalities in
education-were fairly well-established in the context ofvoting rights law.""
We part company only when she moves beyond this context. In her view,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. also supports her position, since it forbids employers
86. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
87. See Franklin, supra note 77.
88. 1 introduce the notion of sphere-specific equality in my discussion of Brown, see 3
ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 128-29 (in general), 131-33 (stages 4 and 5), but it serves as a
leitmotif throughout, see id. at 152 (announcing a major theme organizing the remaining
chapters' sphere-by-sphere examination of the civil rights revolution).
89. Franklin, supra note 77, at 2898 (quoting 3 ACKERMAN, supra note i, at 165).
90. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
91. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 165.
92. Compare Professor Franklin's discussion of Katzenbach v. Morgan and Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections, see Franklin, supra note 77, at 2895-97, with my analysis of the same
cases, 3 ACKERMAN, supra note i, at i07-21.




to impose seemingly neutral standardized tests which have a disproportionate
impact on blacks." But Griggs went on to say that the company could continue
to use such tests provided that they reliably predicted on-the-job performance. In
other words, so long as they were justified on sphere-specific grounds, testing
could proceed even if it had a disproportionate effect on black applicants."
Rather than allowing extra-spherical injustices to trump intra-spherical
considerations, Griggs insists on the primacy of spherical criteria, so long as
they are genuinely relevant to the case at hand. So far as I can see, Professor
Franklin doesn't take this basic point into account.
She is on solider ground when she moves beyond the civil rights era to
consider Nevada Department of Transportation v. Hibbs," where the Court in
2003 did indeed uphold the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) on
interspherical grounds: In mandating twelve weeks of family leave, the statute
tried to assure greater equality in the workplace- especially for women-by
requiring employers to take home-life realities into account.17 Moreover,
Professor Franklin uses Hibbs to raise a more fundamental question. As she
notes, it was possible to pass the FMLA without the massive and sustained
mobilization required for another successful constitutional moment. Can't we
continue to make similar progress on an evolutionary basis, slowly breaking
down the interspherical barriers that prevent poor and stigmatized groups
from fully sharing in the gains of the civil rights revolution?
I certainly hope so-what is more, I don't see any constitutional objection
to step-by-step endorsements of intersphericality. Since the Second
Reconstruction engaged in such context-specific moves in the area of voting, it
does provide a precedent for similar acts of specific trans-sphericity in the
future.
Given the plutocratic realities of present-day politics, however, I remain
skeptical about the realistic potential of small-bore approaches. If the next
generation of ordinary Americans want real-world equal opportunity for their
94. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see Franklin, supra note 77, at 2902-03.
95. For a more elaborate discussion of this point, see 3 ACKERMAN, supra note i, at 185.
96. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
97. Franklin, supra note 77, at 2893-94. But I disagree with Professor Franldin's suggestion, id.,
that the "interspherical kind of reasoning" exemplified by Hibbs was also on display in
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). While the Court did indeed emphasize VMI's
strategic relationship to success in other spheres of life in explaining why it was prioritizing
the institution for equal protection scrutiny, this priority issue is analytically distinct from
the interspherical impact question under discussion here. See supra notes 85-88 and
accompanying text.
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children, they will have to win it the good-old-fashioned American way-by
organizing a new political movement for a Third Reconstruction, and winning
election after election until their demands for social justice are vindicated in the
name of We the People.
In any event, this book's sole objective is to make it plain that such
exercises of popular sovereignty have served as a vital force in our recent past,
thereby providing a precedent that might serve as a lodestar for future efforts
to revitalize and expand our constitutional commitments to equality in the
twenty-first century.
In presenting my six-point summary of the civil rights legacy, the principle
of sphericality has turned out to be the most controversial. But Professor Smith
also usefully pinpoints other questions surrounding my presentation. He
suggests that my emphasis on anti-humiliation may give the impression that
the landmark statutes impose "a mandate for colorblind policies."' If so, this
would be a misreading: I devote lots of pages to demonstrating that these
transformative initiatives clearly endorse statistical techniques to assess real-
world compliance with spherical obligations."
It is also a mistake to read me as advocating the near-exclusive pursuit of
the anti-humiliation principle. It is no less imperative to fulfill the more
ambitious egalitarian objectives that the landmark statutes impose on each
sphere (which, as we have seen, vary as the statutes and cases move from
education to employment to housing to voting, and beyond).
It is only when the anti-humiliation principle directly conflicts with
government-by-numbers that we have a serious priority problem. This is, at
least, the lesson I draw from the Court's responses to the busing controversy of
the early 1970s. In this context, I argue that the Court's stress on anti-
humiliation in the City ofEmporia case provides a better reference point than its
subsequent embrace of government-by-numbers in Keyes and Milliken.' But
this limited claim should not obscure the larger six-point agenda that emerges
from a systematic assessment of the legacy of the Second Reconstruction.
98. Smith, supra note 42, at 2913.
99. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 160-70 (discussing voting); id. at i8o-87 (discussing
employment); id. at 222 (discussing housing).




C. Humiliation, Reconsidered and Revitalized
Nevertheless, the anti-humiliation principle is of great importance, and I
am grateful to Professor Deborah Hellman for putting Brown's logic under the
analytic microscope.'
On her view, Warren was only concerned with the effect of segregation on
the "the hearts and minds of black school children."o 2 Moreover, it was "social
science, rather than interpretive judgment" that served as the Court's "tool" in
determining the impact.10
I disagree. Professor Hellman is placing too much weight on Warren's
famous Footnote ii, which cites Kenneth Clark's "doll study," and other social
scientific investigations, to establish stigmatizing impact. If we lift our eyes
from the footnotes to the text, we see Warren basing his claim on the findings
of a Kansas trial court that "the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group." 0 4 Social science only
comes into the argument when Warren further supports "this finding" by
claiming that it "is amply supported by modern authority"-which is the point
where he drops his Footnote ii.
To express the two-stage character of Warren's argument, my elaboration
of Brown's lost logic proceeds by distinguishing two analytically distinct steps:
the first, emphasizing the capacity of "judges, and the rest of us, to make
commonsense judgments about the prevailing meaning of social practices";os
the second, seeking to determine whether we can "buttress[] . .. commonsense
conclusions with the findings of social science.""' 6
Professor Charles Black long ago urged a reading that put common sense
first, and science second;o' as did the Burger Court in 1972, when it codified
Brown's doctrine in Wright v. City ofEmporia. 1os Even if Warren had eliminated
Footnote ii, his appeal to commonsense interpretation of social meaning
101. Deborah Hellman, Equal Protection in the Key ofRespect, 123 YALE L.J. 3036 (2014).
102. Id. at 3046.
1o3. Id.
104. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (emphasis added).
105. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note i, at 131.
1o6. Id. at 132.
107. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960);
see 3 AcKERMAN, supra note 1, at 362 n.11.
108. 407 U.S. 451 (1972); see 3 AcKERMAN, supra note 1, at 267-70.
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sufficed to ground his judgment. Professor Hellman fails to appreciate this key
point.
Paradoxically, this failure makes Professor Hellman's principal arguments
more-not less-important. Her main contribution isn't her (mis)reading of
Brown. It is her invitation to refine our understanding of the stigmatizing social
meanings with which Brown is in fact principally concerned.
Broadly speaking, Professor Hellman and I agree that these expressive
assaults on dignity condemn a person or group to public dishonor -and that
analytic progress will come by reflecting on the different ways in which
English-speakers address the subject. For example, consider a conversation in
which I tell you about an incident in which I was humiliated. In describing my
situation in this way, I am saying something different from claiming that I
have been embarrassed or ashamed or ....
The question Professor Hellman raises is whether humiliation provides the
best way to describe Brown's deepest concerns. In her view, a better path to
travel is the road marked by the verb "to demean.""o
I have a threshold problem with her proposal. It diverts us from the
language used by ordinary Americans in expressing the modalities of dishonor:
If I had told my uncle (who was an ordinary working guy) that I'd been
shamed, embarrassed, or humiliated, he would have immediately understood
what I was talking about, and we could talk about whether I'd appropriately
diagnosed the incident that provoked my anxiety. But if I had told him that I'd
been "demeaned," my use of this high-toned talk would lead him to drop
further conversation on the subject with his nephew from the Ivy League.
Putting this non-trivial point to one side, I'm also unpersuaded by
Professor Hellman's elaboration of the concept. In her view, "demeaning"
behavior is best understood by asking two questions: Is the alleged wrong-
doer expressing a denigrating message? And does the perpetrator -call him the
"demeaner," since we lack a standard term -have the victim in his power?"o
Professor Hellman requires a Yes to both questions before a message
"demeans" its target. I disagree: As a matter of social meaning, a Yes on the
first question should suffice. It's quite common for spokesmen for the
powerless to demean the powerful, expressing contempt for their cavalier
treatment, or despicable indifference, to others who are less fortunate. To be
sure, it's easier for plutocrats or kleptocrats or their legal representatives to





ignore these critiques, but they are nevertheless well aware of them -and they
sometimes react defensively to the assaults on their honor, lashing out at the
ingratitude of the masses who fail to appreciate the great social contributions of
the top one-tenth-of-one-percent.
Nevertheless, these cases don't count as "demeaning" for Professor
Hellman. She insists that the "demeaner" also have the victim in his or her
power. In adding this second condition, Professor Hellman isn't engaged in a
philosophical inquiry into community understandings expressed by ordinary
language. She's doing something different, and no less commendable: She is
trying to elaborate a legal doctrine that makes the best sense of Brown's effort to
root equal protection law in social meaning.
When judged as an exercise in legal interpretation, however, I think her
emphasis on the power of the perpetrator does not do justice to the distinctive
character of Warren's reasoning. To see my point, recall Professor Kennedy's
critique of Brown. As he rightly emphasized, Warren's opinion is distinctive
precisely because it portrays an insult without an insulter."' In placing the
focus on the power of the "insulter," a/k/a the "demeaner," Professor
Hellman's second criterion is unfaithful to this central aspect of Brown's legacy.
In contrast, my account of institutionalized humiliation builds directly upon
Warren's reasoning. Professor Hellman's critique largely misses this point
because she focuses on my introductory presentation, which invites the reader
to consider the occasions on which he or she has been personally humiliated in
life. I agree with her that a fuller treatment of this subject would require a host
of additional complexities."' Nevertheless, my brief treatment sufficed for my
larger purpose, which was to introduce Brown's special concern with
institutionalized humiliation:
in. Kennedy, supra note 69, at 3069.
112. My discussion of personal humiliation is restricted to a few paradigm cases, and doesn't try
to work out all the peripheral complexities. Since it was only intended as a prelude to the
larger inquiry into institutionalized humiliation, a full analysis of one-on-one cases would
have required a lengthy detour from my central aim.
Professor Hellman doesn't take the partial character of my effort sufficiently into
account in discussing my views. For example, she believes that I am committed to the
notion that "humiliating treatment is produced by virtue of some effort or intention,"
because I say that the "victim must 'acquiesce[] in the effort to impugn his standing."'
Hellman, supra note oi, at 3040. (Professor Hellman is quoting me, but providing her own
emphasis.) But this reads too much into the word "effort," which comes in my summary
conclusions derived from the analysis of paradigmatic cases of personal humiliation. I
entirely agree that a full analysis of one-on-one cases would require a consideration of a
variety of situations in which intentionality was indirect or non-existent.
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Up to now, I've been telling stories of personal humiliation that occur
against the background premise of shared social competence. The
reason my scenarios are damaging is that they operate to strip the
victim of this ongoing presumption of competence, thereby degrading
him in the eyes of the relevant community. In contrast, humiliation is
institutionalized by social practices that strip an entire group of this ongoing
presumption. The imposition of a systematic degradation ritual is even
worse than the individualized form . . . ."
Although Professor Hellman's main discussion involves other matters, she
recognizes this key point in a characteristically fair-minded discussion of Rosa
Parks's act of defiance in the Montgomery bus boycott. After presenting her
critique of my views, she considers a possible response:
[Ackerman] might say that while Parks herself wasn't humiliated, the
practice of segregating public buses was humiliating, as others certainly
did acquiesce in the treatment. Or perhaps he might say that the bus
driver's order to Parks to move to the back of the bus is an attempt to
humiliate her .... ."4
She is absolutely right: this is precisely what I would say. In my view, it is the
social practice that counts in determining the existence of institutionalized
humiliation. More precisely, I understand an institution as a system of roles
whose meanings are internalized by participants. If, for example, you reacted
with surprise when a New Haven bus driver asked you to pay your bus fare as
you entered, you would immediately reveal yourself to be an alien from some
distant land, who knew nothing about the institution of public transportation
in America. As a well-socialized resident of New Haven, you would not need
any such instruction: it simply "goes without saying" that you are supposed to
drop the money in the machine.
This much is obvious, but we'll hit pay-dirt by continuing the bus story
beyond the boarding stage: Imagine that the New Haven bus is almost
empty -there's only a black couple sitting toward the back, and a white guy
sitting toward the front. Boarding in 2014, this spatial pattern would have no
special significance to you or me. In enacting my social role as bus passenger, it
goes without saying that I can sit anywhere I like, and so can everybody else.
113. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 139 (emphasis added).




But this was not true in Montgomery in 1955. To the contrary, all socially
competent actors had then internalized a very different understanding of their
social role as bus passengers, requiring them to match their seats with their
race. Not only that, this form of role-playing had a particular social meaning:
"separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
negro group"-if I may be permitted to extend Warren's words from the
sphere of public schools to the sphere of public transportation."
Institutionalized humiliation can survive even if every single white and
black person on the bus conscientiously believed that segregation was terrible.
Professor Hellman describes the social meaning of segregation as "objective,"
but to emphasize its sociological character, I will call it the conventional
meaning of a particular role-system that has been institutionalized in a
particular time and place. Such conventions do not necessarily depend on the
bus company, or other institution, putting up a big sign proclaiming that
"Negroes should go to the back of the bus." They can often survive without an
express announcement, so long as the relevant institution doesn't take
affirmative action to revolutionize existing practices. This means that the
national or state government may well be obliged to deploy technocratic
techniques - "government by numbers" - to determine whether institutions are
complying with their constitutional responsibilities.
But as Professor Kenji Yoshino notes, test-case litigation may also provide a
valuable vehicle for bringing forms of institutionalized humiliation forward for
constitutional scrutiny.16 Professor Yoshino is also right to see Lawrence and
Windsor as contemporary vindications of the anti-humiliation principle.
Although Justice Scalia denounces Justice Kennedy's opinion as meaningless
"argle-bargle,"'1 7 the majority opinion virtually paraphrases Brown's famous
lines in emphasizing the "humiliat[ions]" DOMA imposed on "tens of
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples . . . mak[ing] it
even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of
their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in
their daily lives.""
115. While the Supreme Court upheld the lower court decision requiring desegregation of the
Montgomery buses in Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956), its cryptic per curiam did
not explicitly extend Brown's reasoning in the way that I have done here.
n6. Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE L.J 3076
(2014).
117. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 2694 (majority opinion).
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Justice Kennedy does not expressly link his formulations to Chief Justice
Warren's in Brown-probably to avoid a premature attack on the state statutes
imposing second-class status on the LGBT community. Nevertheless, Warren's
teachings seem decisive in future cases: After all, if Brown was right to
condemn institutionalized humiliation by states on the basis of race in the
sphere of education, why shouldn't the anti-humiliation principle require the
Roberts Court to strike down institutionalized humiliation by states in the
sphere of marriage?
If there is a good answer to this question, I haven't heard it yet. If Justice
Kennedy follows through on his previous opinions, he will establish that the
civil rights revolution is alive and well in this contemporary struggle for
dignity.
D. The Decline and Fall(?) of Title VII
But Windsor is very much the exception to the general rule followed by the
Roberts Court.
Professor Sophia Lee tells the tragic story of the ongoing judicial
trivialization of Title VII's great constitutional breakthroughs."' During the
civil rights revolution, Congress and the President not only repudiated
restrictive state action doctrines, inherited from the First Reconstruction, to
require hundreds of thousands of private businesses to assure real-world
equality of opportunity for blacks and other vulnerable groups. They also
authorized technocratic tests to enforce this demanding constitutional
responsibility on employers.
Yet decades of judicial hostility have now set the stage for today's Justices
to launch an all-out assault on government-by-numbers in this sphere.
Professor Lee explains how the case-law has evolved since 1973 to create the
impression that We the Judges of the Roberts Court have the authority to
strike down one of the greatest achievements of We the People of the
Twentieth Century.
As she suggests, this act of betrayal isn't inevitable. It remains doctrinally
plausible for a judicial majority to engage in a bit of legalistic jiu-jtsu -using
the nineteenth century's "state action" doctrine to preserve a portion - but only
11g. Sophia Z. Lee, A Revolution at War with ItselJ Preserving Employment Preferences from Weber




a portion-of the twentieth century's commitment to government-by-
numbers.12o
But, as Lee anticipates, I have a more fundamental complaint. It is utterly
illegitimate for the Court to betray any part of the twentieth century's
landmark statute on the ground of its incompatibility with the Fourteenth
Amendment's narrower nineteenth-century understanding of equal protection.
In case of a conflict between two constitutional moments, it is the later decision
by We the People that trumps the earlier one."' This act of judicial betrayal is
especially bitter, given the history of the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment
presented in Transformations. As I show there, the Reconstruction Congress
only succeeded in putting the Amendment on the books by playing fast and
loose with many of the rules and principles established by Article Five."'
In contrast, the Title VII story provides a case study in modern higher
lawmaking at its very best. In taking up the problem of fair employment,
Congress and the President did not come to their breakthrough decisions
lightly. They reached them over the course of an eight-year process of
deliberation, experimentation, and repeated shows of broad and deep political
support -beginning with the authorization of technocratic experimentation in
the 1964 Act, followed by the EEOC's creative elaborations during the next six
years, followed by the Supreme Court's explicit approval of agency expertise in
120. Id. at 2974.
121. See supra P. 3121.
122. To encourage readers to immerse themselves in the full blow-by-blow account presented in
We the People: Transformations, here is John Bingham calling upon his colleagues to endorse
the desperate expedients of the Fourth Reconstruction Act because the "final ratification and
incorporation" of the Fourteenth Amendment "may depend" on their approval. No less
significantly, Bingham was not embarrassed by this brute appeal to realpolitik. To the
contrary, he took to the floor to bring its importance to "the attention of the House and of
this country." See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 231. Similarly, the point was so obvious
at the time that Justice Miller emphasized it in his opinion for the Court in the Slaughter-
House Cases:
[T]he statesmen who had conducted the Federal government in safety through
the crisis of the rebellion . . . passed through Congress the proposition for the
fourteenth amendment, and they declined to treat as restored to their full participation
in the government of the Union the States which had been in insurrection, until they
ratified that article by aformal vote of their legislative bodies.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-71 (1872) (emphasis added).
Professor Mark Graber greatly enriches my account of the problematic origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment in his work-in-progress, Constructing Constitutional Politics: The
Reconstruction Strategy for Protecting Rights.
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Griggs, followed by the self-conscious endorsement of government-by-
numbers by President Nixon and Congress in their fair employment statute of
1972-thereby reaffirming the breadth and depth of the support for this
initiative by the American people.'
It would be a very sad day if the Roberts Court were to condemn this
landmark achievement of We the People of the Twentieth Century because it
violated its (cramped) interpretation of the "equal protection" clause enacted
under far more problematic circumstances in the aftermath of the Civil War."
Given the stark factual contrast between the First and Second
Reconstructions in winning the broad support of the American people, I don't
think it's necessary to confront an important theoretical question raised by
Professor Lee. As she explains, the story she tells does indeed suggest the need
for dualist theorists to elaborate criteria for determining when "the window for
[higher lawmaking] closes and [the period] for judicial betrayal opens."'" I am
particularly reluctant to write a paragraph or two because Professor Stuart
Chinn has devoted an entire book to the subject in his forthcoming
Recalibrating Reform: The Limits of Political Change. 1 6 Since I'm sure the book
will provoke lots of debate, we may well gain greater clarity on the stakes raised
by the issue of closure over the next few years.
In the meantime, Professor John D. Skrentny's essay raises a new agenda
for fair employment law."' Over the decades, a wide range of private and
governmental institutions has gradually elaborated a strategy of "racial
realism" that endorses a novel form of affirmative action based on neither the
anti-humiliation nor equal opportunity principles codified by Title VII. Under
this approach, racial preferences are granted for the purpose of maximizing
firm profits or other institutional goals. Professor Skrentny is right to suggest
that "realistic" racial preferences raise fundamental issues under the landmark
statute.
123. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note i, at 184-94.
124. See Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1627 (2013) (reaching a similar methodological conclusion after an independent
assessment of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).
125. Lee, supra note 1i9, at 3000.
126. STUART CHINN, RECALIBRATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL CHANGE (forthcoming
2014). I comment on an earlier version of Chinn's thesis in Bruce Ackerman, Beyond
Presentism: A Comment on Stuart Chinn's Race, the Supreme Court, and the Judicial-Institutional
Interest in Stability, 1 J.L. 185 (2011).





As he emphasizes, Title VII does not explicitly allow for race to serve as a
bona fide occupation qualification for a job - and for an obvious reason. Before
it was passed in 1964, businesses had often justified blatant acts of racial
discrimination on profit-maximizing grounds. Time and again, employers
denied that they themselves were racists in refusing equal opportunity to
blacks. They tried instead to excuse their discriminatory practices by explaining
that they were simply satisfying racist customers, who were insisting on service
by their race-mates. Given consumer preferences, equal opportunity was bad
business.
The landmark statute decisively rejected such excuses in 1964; the question
is whether equal protection law, as elaborated by Title VII, should also reject
them in 2014. The issue is especially important since, as Professor Skrentny
points out, "racial realism" pushes some blacks down dead-end career paths
that "lack promotion possibilities.",128
I cannot do justice to the complex issues raised by Professor Skrentny's
contextual analysis.' But I can highlight the jurisprudential stakes involved,
by contrasting my general position to the common-law approach favored by
Professor Strauss. On his model, thoughtful judges can't help but be impressed
by the broad-ranging adoption of "racial realism" by social, political, and
economic institutions in the early twenty-first century. The depth and breadth
of this sea change provide very strong arguments in favor of its acceptance by
common law constitutionalists.
In contrast, as Professor Skrentny anticipates, my emphasis on the judicial
imperative to preserve the achievements of the Second Reconstruction leads to
a more critical encounter with these social and economic trends. Contemporary
acceptance of "racial realism" in a variety of low-visibility contexts should not
be allowed to erase the high-visibility decision by We the People to reject
profit-maximization, and analogous considerations, as legitimate reasons for
discriminatory treatment during the civil rights revolution. This self-conscious
decision places a heavy burden of constitutional justification on the defenders
of evolving practices, however "realistic" they may seem to business, non-
profit, and governmental officials. 30
Given Professor Lee's sad story about the disintegration of Title VII case-
law over the past half-century, it's anybody's guess how the courts will
128. Id. at 3033-34.
129. Which is elaborated more fully in his new book, JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS:
RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2013).
130. Skrentny, supra note 127.
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confront "racial realism" issues as they arise on their dockets. But the
competing aspirations of preservationism and common law constitutionalism
can't help but make a difference -both in the pattern of judicial decisions and
in the larger society's understanding of the civil rights legacy.
E. The Tragedy of the Voting Rights Act
Finally, let's turn to the sphere in which the Court's betrayal of the
twentieth century is most obvious: voting rights. My concluding Chapter
confronts Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Shelby County v. Holder,"' which
struck down key provisions of the Voting Rights Act. This opinion not only
repudiates the core of a great landmark statute endorsed by the American
People during the Second Reconstruction; it also reveals a shocking ignorance
surrounding the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and how it provides
independent support for the modern Voting Rights Act.12
Professor Samuel Bagenstos considers how Congress might respond to this
disaster -arguing that race-specific, as well as universal, remedies are required
to sustain the integrity of the democratic process in the twenty-first century.'33
His arguments are persuasive, but it is important to add another factor into
the equation: President Obama and Congress should make it clear that it was
wrong for Chief justice Roberts to strike down the twenty-five-year statutory
renewal enacted into law as the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta
Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 20o6.
As the statutory title suggests, President George W. Bush and his Republican
131. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
132. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that states that create barriers to black
voting can suffer a proportionate reduction in their representation in the House and in the
Electoral College. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This provision, together with section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides Congress with all the authority it needed to enact the
Voting Rights Act of 20o6, as "appropriate legislation" preventing states from suffering the
severe reductions in their representation in the House and in the Electoral College that
would otherwise occur by barring black voters from the polls in violation of section 2. But
neither the Court's opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, nor the dissent by Justice Ginsburg,
even mentions the existence of section 2. To the contrary, the Chief Justice asserts a
presumption of equal state sovereignty, without noting that section 2 explicitly rejects this
principle in the sphere of voting rights. I know of no decision in American history which
engages in a similar act of judicial amnesia. For further discussion, see 3 ACKERMAN, supra
note 1, at 330-32, 403-04 nn. 9-12. See also Graber, supra note 122.
133. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After




Congress believed it essential to sustain the country's commitment to one of
the greatest achievements of the American people in the twentieth century-
what is more, they passed this statute with overwhelming majorities even
though it did not serve the narrow partisan interest of the Republican Party.
The Roberts Court simply had no authority to repudiate this solemn act of
political recommitment. Congress and the President have a high responsibility
to put the Court on notice that similar acts of betrayal will further discredit its
claim to serve as a bulwark against the erosion of the great constitutional
achievements of the past two centuries.
Let me conclude with a fast-forward to the year 2033, when Americans will
be celebrating another remarkable semi-centenary. Fifty years earlier, President
Ronald Reagan signed legislation making the birthday of Martin Luther King,
Jr. into a national holiday. Before 1983, Americans celebrated only three special
days directing civic attention to their constitutional legacy: Independence Day,
Washington's Birthday, and Lincoln's Birthday (outside the South). But
President Reagan and Congress transformed this long standing tradition into
our modern trinity: Independence Day, President's Day, and Martin Luther
King, Jr. Day. How, then, will Americans celebrate MLK Day in 2033?
Perhaps in the manner we celebrate President's Day in 2014. Throughout
the land, there are pallid public ceremonies, and high school civics classes,
memorializing the heroic achievements of Washington and Lincoln. But the
eyes of the Nation are fixed on the latest news of President's Day bargains,
with Americans rushing to the stores in an orgy of cut-rate consumerism.
By 2033, MLK Day may be like that too. Lawyers and judges will play an
honored part in school classrooms and civic ceremonies: If they are formalists,
they will tell of Dr. King's role in enacting the Twenty-Fourth Amendment; if
they are court-centered doctrinalists, they will cite even more obscure texts, say
Gayle v. Browder,"14 to explain the complicated ways the Warren Court
intervened to support King's civil rights struggle. As the audiences nod their
heads with a ritual show of respect, their eyes will be glued to their super-
iPhones in search of the best MLK Day bargains.
But a different future is also possible.
134- 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).
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Behold: Lawyers, judges, politicians, and ordinary Americans are telling
each other the dramatic story of mobilized civil rights engagement with a
bipartisan coalition in Congress, the presidency, and the Court, that
revolutionized our collective commitment to real-world equality. As they tell
stories of the Second Reconstruction to one another, what will happen next?
Perhaps Americans of 2033 will turn off their Google Glass for a moment
and look at the real-world injustices in their midst? Perhaps they will ask one
another whether they too might contribute to the great tradition of popular
sovereignty to which King dedicated his life?
We shall overcome.
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